In a 7-1 vote, a Louisiana Parish decided to repeal a prohibition that it had placed on soothsaying. A federal judge ruled that the parish’s prohibition against soothsaying was unconstitutional after a Wiccan minister, Cliff Eakin, sued the parish over the ordinance. After the parish's attorney recommended that they overturn the statute as opposed to go to court over it they council voted 7-1 to allow soothsaying.
This decision seemed much like the Church of Babalu v. Haileah in which a town in Florida passed a law outlawing animal sacrifices because a new church opened that took part in such sacrifices. The Supreme Court decided 9-0 that this statute was unconstitutional because the ordinance specifically targeted one church's activities. The parish in Louisiana's statute wasn't created until after Katrina when many practitioners of soothsaying moved to the Livingston Parish. Because the ordinance was specifically directed toward one group it wasn't content neutral which made it unconstitutional.
I think that the council made the right decision to overturn the decision because there is clear precedent that shows it was unconstitutional. The Federal court decided that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated free speech, but to me this seems more like a free exercise issue. If Wiccan's are being prohibited from practicing their religion there is clearly an issue. I'm not sure why speech played a role because it seems like a clear violation of free exercise. Although the outcome remains the same, the reasoning behind the decision may have been equally important. If the council had refused to overturn the statute I think the Wiccan's would have had a better case based on religious rights as opposed to free speech.
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2 comments:
I agree with Jonny regarding this issue of soothsaying. This is because of two factors. First, it seems the Louisiana council wanted to censor the happenings inside their realm of control. Second, I believe it would have been more appropriate to bring a free exercise argument rather than a free speech argument.
First, the Louisiana council's decision-making process seems eerily similar to the Church of Babalu v. Haileah. This is because the towns were attempting to keep a religious entity and their non-conforming societal ills to the individuals towns. The councils thought they would fix the problem through local ordinances, with flawed justification.
Second, I would have much rather seen this case be taken on as a freedom of exercise case. I believe it would prove to be much more interesting and if it would have went to the Supreme Court; it would have furthered jurisprudential precedent. However, as the religion in question is not a mainstream religion, it probably did make sense on the part of the religious entity to label the case a free speech issue.
I mostly agree with Johnny on this case, but I think the council did the correct thing politically calling this case a free speech case. At issue here is the difference between recognizing this church's right to engage in a religious and political practice, but also seems to be on the edge of establishment. If the parish council had recognized soothsaying as a religious practice, what would have been the implications. Although this seems similiar to precedent, I think we need to stay away from over generalizing these cases. The court must decide these cases in a case by case basis and not dismiss them as similiar, but reaffirm precedent with decisions similiar to other cases.
However, I do see Johnny's and Tyler's points here. Both cases seem to have been targeted at a particular group for a particular practice that seemed out of line with the community. We need to make sure that we repsect this organizations political rights, but as Neuhaus says, the rights of the majority still reign superior.
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